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During the last two decades, product labeling has become an increasingly used policy tool,
particularly with respect to the provision of health and environmerrtd information. Theory
holds that the flow of information among market participants plays a critical role in the
efficient operation of markets. This paper explores the role of product labeling policy in
ameliorating two potential market deficiencies: asymmetric information and costly search
behavior, Practical considerations for the design and implementation of labeling policy and of
labeling research are explored,
During the last two decades, product labeling has
become an increasingly used policy tool, particu-
larly with respect to the provision of health and
environmental information. As a result, product-
labeling policy is a topic of growing interest and
public debate at both the federal and state levels.
An example at the federal level includes USDA’s
current rulemaking on organic labeling of foods.
Examples at the state level include measures to
impose price and environmental labeling of elec-
tricity, emissions labeling of automobiles, and in-
gredient labeling of cigarettes. The labeling debate
is largely about information and the processing and
use of that information by consumers. The debate
centers on questions such as how much informa-
tion to supply to consumers to facilitate effective
choice and how that information should be sup-
plied.
A tenet of economic theory holds that the flow
of information among market participants plays a
critical role in the efficient operation of markets.
However, when the flow of information is associ-
ated with explicit costs (e.g., costly search [Dia-
mond 197 1], cost] y revelation of arbitrage oppor-
tunities [Grossman and Stiglitz 1980]) or implicit
costs (adverse selection or moral hazard [Akerloff
1970]), markets can lose the neoclassical promise
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of efficiency (Stiglitz 1996). In this paper, we are
interested in exploring the role of informational
labeling in the operation of consumer product mar-
kets. We present an economic framework that
might be used to estimate the economic benefits
associated with labeling policies and explore a
plethora of practical considerations that must be
addressed before labeling policies are imple-
mented. Throughout the paper we turn to both eco-
nomic and psychological theory to explore several
of these implementation issues.
Labeling Defined
We begin our discussion of labeling issues by first
defining what we mean by labeling or a labeling
program. We define product labeling as any policy
instrument of a government or other third party
that somehow regulates the presentation of prod-
uct-specific information to consumers. This infor-
mation might describe use characteristics of the
product, such as price, taste, and nutrition, or non-
use characteristics, such as the environmental im-
pact or moral/ethical elements surrounding the
product’s manufacturing process,
Labeling policy can differ along three major
continua: compulsoriness, explicitness, and stan-
dardization. First, a labeling policy can vary in its
degree of compulsoriness, the degree to which
firms are required to provide product information.
At one extreme, labeling restrictions are manda-
tory: certain pieces of information are required to
be displayed on the product. At the other extreme,Teisl and Roe Economics of Labeling 141
labeling restrictions are voluntary: firms chose
what information, if any, will be displayed. Most
third-party certification programs (e.g., the Green
Seal, Good Housekeeping Seal) fall into the vol-
untary category. An intermediate example is
claims-based labeling, wherein firms are required
to disclose particular items of information, often in
a specified format, only when a certain type of
claim is made about the product elsewhere on the
label or in product advertising. Under these types
of labeling policies, firms have at least some con-
trol over the information presented on their prod-
uct.
The second major component of labeling poli-
cies is explicitness, the degree of information detail
presented to consumers. Current ISO 14000 nego-
tiations provide a useful nomenclature here. ISO
14000 identifies two types of labels (Type I and
III) that are differentiated by the level of informa-
tion detail. 1Type I labels provide the least amount
of detail concerning attribute values. With a Type
I label, the information about a vector of attribute
levels is condensed into a one-dimensional score
by an agreed-upon scoring algorithm. Products re-
ceiving a score above a predetermined threshold
may present a seal of approval or certification. At
the other extreme are Type III labels, which pro-
vide the most detailed information. Information is
disclosed about several of the products attributes
(e.g., nutrition labels on food), and the disclosure
typically involves continuous or categorical infor-
mation about each element (e.g., grams of fat,
high/mediurn/low risk). Type 111labels are gener-
ally considered the most objective of the label cat-
egories, while Type I labels are often considered
the most normative.
The third major component of labeling policies
is standardization, the degree to which the regula-
tion requires the information to be provided in a
presentation format that is standardized and uni-
form across products. At one extreme, a labeling
policy can make presentation format requirements
quite explicit, where the firm has no discretion
over the presentation. For example, warning labels
on cigarettes and alcoholic beverages have word-
ing, font size, font typeface, and message location
prescribed by regulation. Alternatively, the content
of the information may be regulated but the firm
has some discretion over the presentation of the
information (e.g., health claims on food labels).
Justifications for Labeling
To economists, an obvious next question is <‘What
is the economic justification for labeling pro-
grams?” As we pointed out in the introduction, the
efficiency of markets is eroded as the flow of in-
formation among market participants is impeded or
as information flow becomes costly.
Simply stated, labeling policies can circumvent
these market inefficiencies by making the informa-
tion initially held by the firm also available to the
consumer, This removal of information asymmetry
or subsidization of search costs is clearly beneficial
to consumers as they are now more informed as to
the exact attributes of the product. Choices will be
more closely in line with preferences, and uncer-
tainty regarding the nature of product attributes is
minimized during the choice process. Firms that
produce goods with desirable attributes also gain,
as they are rewarded for marginal improvements in
the quality of various attributes, Even firms selling
low-quality products may gain. Consider a case of
severe adverse selection (e.g., Akerloff 1970)
where consumers know only the average quality of
goods and have no other means to infer quality. In
such a case, labeling of product attributes is one
method of creating a market that would otherwise
collapse because of adverse selection. Hence firms
selling low-quality goods will be able to sell goods
and benefit from the existence of the market.z
However, the costs and benefits of labeling are
likely to depend upon the type of attributes con-
sidered. Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) outline
three types of product attributes: search, experi-
ence, and credence.3 Search attributes are those
that can be assessed prior to purchase via research
and inspection (e.g., color and size). Experience
attributes are those that are assessed only after pur-
chase and use (e.g., convenience). Credence attrib-
utes are those that cannot be easily verified even
after uurchase and use but whose value effects util-
hy (e~g., the nutritional component of food).
Caswell and Mojduszka suggest that labeling
plays an increasingly beneficial role as attributes
progress along the spectrum from search to expe-
rience to credence.4 The movement along this spec-
trum is roughly correlated to the cost or difficulty an
individurd would face while trying to independently
overcome the information asymmetry. For example,
identifying the color and size of a certain object
(search attributes) can be done rather quickly or
cheaply by most individuals, while verifying that a
firm used 75% postconsumer recycled material to
create the package (credence attribute) would be
tremendously difficult. In fact, the individual may
have no legal authority to undertake such an inves-
tigation.
Conversely, as one progresses along the spec-
trum of attributes from search to credence, the
comparative advantage of a government or other142 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
third-party organization in providing the informa-
tion services becomes more obvious. One obvious
advantage is that such an organization has econo-
mies of scale in verifying, monitoring, and dis-
seminating information. Another advantage is that
such organizations have means to require the re-
lease of the asymmetric information and to penal-
ize firms that they find to be misrepresenting such
information. For example, governmental organiza-
tions may use force of law to require disclosure or
to penalize deceptive firms, while third-party or-
ganizations may have economies of scale in harm-
ing deceptive firms’ reputations by organizing pro-
tests or coordinating lawsuits.
However, labeling is not costless, There is often
the fear that labeling will cause “excess inertia” or
“lock-in” in the Farrel and Saloner (1985) sense.
That is, for a particular product, a labeling regime
may include only certain attributes or may use a
certain criterion for the awarding of a seal of ap-
proval. If there are changes in the marketplace,
with regards to either technology or consumer
preferences, appropriate changes in the labeling
scheme may be greatly lagged because of institu-
tional bureaucracies and coordination difficulties.
Also, there are the obvious costs of gathering, veri-
fying, and monitoring the needed information and
administrating the labeling program. These costs
are likely to be positively correlated to the private
costs mentioned above.
Given these cost and benefit considerations, one
might imagine that labeling policies are least likely
to be justifiable for search attributes. Often it is
assum~d that the market communications supplied
by firms through voluntary labeling and advertis-
ing will provide a sufficient degree of information
about search attributes to make the market work
efficiently to the benefit of all participants. Even in
the case of search attributes, however, labeling
policies may offer benefits often overlooked in tra-
ditional economic analyses. We argue that without
standardization of information disclosure, some
search attributes effectively resemble experience
or credence attributes. This occurs because certain
search attributes, such as the pricing structure for
some services (e.g., phone and electricity), are very
complex and difficult to judge ex ante. We view
consumers as boundedly rational (Simon 1955;
Conlisk 1996): they face not only budget con-
straints during the decision process but also time
and cognitive constraints. Consumers facing these
constraints may optimally make decisions based on
relatively poor information about the search attrib-
utes. The true nature of these search attributes may
not become evident until after repeated use of the
product (i.e., until one receives several representa-
tive bills), and the true ranking of products in terms
of this attribute may never become obvious.
Consider the most fundamental of search attrib-
utes—product price. It is often implicitly assumed
that firms reveal the product’s price and that con-
sumers understand it with precision and appropri-
ately incorporate it during the decision-making
process. However, consumers must use scarce time
and cognitive resources to rank products or ser-
vices on price and must determine price differ-
ences so that marginal tradeoffs with other attrib-
utes can be made. If different firms communicate
price via different disclosure structures, compari-
sons among competing firms rapidly becomes dif-
ficult, For example, Estelami (1997) showed con-
sumers’ inaccuracies in judging the price of a
single product increased as the complexity of the
pricing scheme increased. From the unit pricing
literature, Russo (1977) showed that consumers’
ability to find the “best deal” was significantly
hindered when only one price existed but product
sizes varied. Even though formats were identical,
information was still difficult to compare because
the unit of comparison was nonstandard.
Psychological studies provide some insight to
the comparison difficulties that arise when con-
sumers encounter nonstandardized information.
Kleinmuntz and Schkade (1993) outlined three ma-
jor components of informational displays that af-
fect the processing tactics consumers employ and,
hence, the time and cognitive costs incurred and
the accuracy derived from these efforts. These
components are form (e. g., numeric/graphic/
verbal), cross-product organization (matrix, para-
graph, hierarchical), and sequence. Schkade and
Kleinmuntz (1994) reported experimental results
suggesting that all three elements affect the diffi-
culty and accuracy of judgment, but the largest
effect was due to cross-product organization. This
suggests that standardizing the display across prod-
ucts would provide the largest benefit to consum-
ers, while improving the sequence and actual dis-
play format is next. Coupey (1994) provided addi-
tional insight to this finding. She found that, when
consumers are faced with information that is not
standardized across products, they often take pro-
cessing shortcuts, such as eliminating certain at-
tributes, eliminating certain products, and rounding
numbers. Hence, standardizing information format
across competing products may increase the num-
ber of products or attributes considered during
choice and may provide more precision in
tradeoffs made by the consumer.
Other research confirms that standardization of
the label format can reduce the cognitive costs of
extracting information, thus facilitating the con-Teisl and Roe
sumer’s primary uses of a product label, i.e., to
make cross-product comparisons of attributes and
to verify firm-provided claims made elsewhere on
the label. For example, when Winneg et al, (1998)
asked consumers to compare two hypothetical
electricity services in terms of price, 82910could
correctly identify the service that cost five dollars
less per month when both products displayed a
standardized format, while only 6090 could do so
when the products used different formats.
Beyond standardization, labels may help im-
prove the credibility of firms’ privately sponsored
communications. Often consumers are highly
skeptical of the honesty of firms’ advertising (Cal-
fee and Ringold 1988); the existence of labeling
allows consumers to verify claims made by adver-
tisers and may hinder some firms from overstating
product qualifications.
It is unclear whether individual firms would ever
find it privately beneficial to organize and display
product information in a standardized format that
would also benefit consumers.5 Disincentives to do
so may stem from a fear that standardized price
displays would promote price competition in mar-
kets that were previously monopolistically com-
petitive, hence driving down profit margins. There
are also the more straightforward costs of coordi-
nation that must be overcome by all the partici-
pants. These include both the logistical costs and
the costs individual firms expend while lobbying
for disclosure formats that highlight their product’s
comparative advantage, In some cases, such as the
products reviewed in Consumer Reports, market
opportunities arise and a third party may profit by
providing such standardized information. But for
items such as household electric service, which
varies greatly from region to region, the market
may not offer such opportunities.~
Determining the Effectiveness of Labeling
How can economists contribute to the design and
implementation of labeling programs? This ques-
tion can be answered in two ways, depending on
the audience. Among policy makers the question
usually means “How can economists help in de-
signing labeling programs that effectively move
current consumer behavior toward some target be-
havior?” Among economists the question appears
as “How can economists help in designing label-
ing programs to maximize net social benefit?”
We’ll discuss both of these questions, starting with
the first.
While labeling has been the focus of major
policy initiatives in the last few years, little em-
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pirical economic research has attempted to under-
stand the market effects of different labeling poli-
cies.’ Presumably, one reason for this lack of re-
search is that policy makers have only recently
shown interest in labeling programs. However, an-
other potential reason is the relative difficulty in
isolating the economic consequences of changes in
information policy.
Most empirical studies have basically used one
of three methods to identify the behavioral effects




They use time-series data to estimate the de-
mand for a commodity or a group of com-
modities as a function of some index of in-
formation.
They estimate demand as a function of indi-
vidual awareness or knowledge.
They assume demand shifts are due to a Dar-
ticuiar information change and use dumm~ed-
trend variables in the demand specification to
denote the change in information.s
A problem with the first approach is that using
an information index as a determinant of market
behavior implicitly assumes information translates
relatively cleanly into consumer awareness and
concern. Psychology and marketing studies indi-
cate that this assumption is often tenuous. Al-
though studies that incorporate health-related
awareness are valuable in linking changes in de-
mand with changes in awareness, they are less
valuable in linking changes in demand with policy-
relevant instruments. Finally, the use of trend vari-
ables is problematic because trend variables, ag-
glomerating all time-varying factors, do not allow
identification and measurement of changes in de-
mand due to changes in information. This is
particularly troublesome because label-induced
market changes may take months or years before
some consumers notice or incorporate the new
information (e.g., Levy et al. 1985; Levy and
Stokes 1987; Schucker et al. 1983; Teisl, Roe, and
Hicks, n,d.).
Ultimately, though, if economists are to make
significant contributions to the design of labeling
policies, the research question is more than wheth-
er labeling programs can work, for there is already
research that indicates that labeling can make sig-
nificant changes in both consumer behavior (e.g.,
Teisl and Levy 1997; Levy et al, 1985; Ippolito and
Mathios 1990, 1996) and producer behavior (e.g.,
Frazao and Allshouse 1996). What is needed is
research that develops understanding of what the
conditions need to be for a labeling policy to be
effective. That is, what characteristics of the inter-144 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
action between the label, the consumer, and the
product affect the impact of information?
For example, the effectiveness of environmental
labeling is partially dependent upon the altruistic
preferences of consumers and their knowledge of
pathways to satisfy their preferences. Furthermore,
the degree of altruism exhibited by an individual
may depend on how information concerning an
environmental attribute is presented, suggesting
that different wording approaches may induce dif-
ferent warm-glow effects (Andreoni 1995),9 In the
environmental arena, this opens the debate to Sci-
tovsky’s (1986) delicate question—can resource
costs be reduced without reducing consumer satis-
faction? In our context we ask another question—
might labels shape preferences by framing the in-
formation so that consumers give additional weight
to attributes associated with environmental costs?
What little market evidence there is does not sup-
port this idea; label information does not seem to
alter consumer behavior in terms of gross “con-
sumption” of product attributes but may simply
allow consumers an increased ability to substitute
across products (Teisl and Levy 1997). Thus, la-
bels may increase consumer welfare but may not
fulfill the goals of health and environmental poli-
cymakers.
The effectiveness of labeling efforts may also
depend on the product category. For example, Stra-
hilevitz and Myers (1998) find that a firm’s offer to
make a charitable contribution upon product pur-
chase is more effective with products classified as
“frivolous luxuries” (e.g., ice cream sundaes) than
with “practical necessities” (e.g., detergent). It is
unclear whether attribute labeling, which may be
viewed as more objective and less persuasive,
would also be product sensitive,
This lack of knowledge regarding the market
effectiveness of labeling policy characteristics is
particularly evident, and potentially troublesome,
with respect to environmental labeling. Environ-
mental labeling programs are widespread; govern-
ment and nongovernment organizations have
implemented various environmental labeling pro-
grams that cover thousands of products in more
than twenty countries (U.S, EPA 1993), Their
widespread use suggests that environmental label-
ing is perceived as an effective method of altering
consumer and producer behavior; however, re-
search concernirw its effectiveness is limited and
quantitative resu~s are rare. Much of the research
has measured effectiveness either by identifying
changes in consumer awareness after exposure to
label information (Hartwell and Bergkamp 1992;
Hashizume 1992; Yakami 1992) or by asking con-
sumers whether labeling programs would affect
their purchase behavior (Chase and Smith 1992).
However, a change in awareness does not neces-
sarily translate into a change in behavior (Bonne-
ville Power Administration 1985; U.S. EPA 1989),
and consumers do not necessarily follow their own
purchasing assertions (Bailey and Eastlick 1993;
Gutfeild 1991). Market-based research investigat-
ing the effectiveness of other types of labels (e.g.,
nutrition labels) may not be applicable to environ-
mental labeling because these other labeling pro-
grams provide information about the use charac-
teristics of the product. Environmental labels often
differentiate products with respect to non-use char-
acteristics.
Environmental certification programs provide
an example of the lack of knowledge surrounding
the market effectiveness of different labeling char-
acteristics. Currently, firms are spending substan-
tial amounts of money and are altering production
methods to obtain environmental certification la-
bels, and organizations like the World Bank sup-
port the use of these Type I labeling programs.
However, focus group research (Teisl, Halverson,
and Holt 1997) indicates that consumers may react
negatively to these Type I environmental labels,
and experimental research (Winneg et al. 1998)
indicates that these labels may be ineffective in
altering consumer behavior. There seem to be two
possible reasons for the counterintuitive results.
First, consumers may view Type I labels as too
value laden. Consumers seem to prefer the more
detailed Type III labels, which allow them more
flexibility in applying their own value judgments,
The second reason consumers may not like Type I
labels is that they may doubt the veracity of the
certifying organization. That is, consumers may in-
voke a <‘schemer’s schema” (Wright 1986) in
which they try to guess the true motivation behind
the communication effort. Consumers may view
the certifying organization as just another market-
ing gimmick employed by the firm and may there-
fore disregard the information.
The Welfare Effects of Labe[ing Policy
Now we turn to the economists’ version of our
earlier question—how can economists contribute
to the design of labeling programs to maximize net
social benefit? In application, this question pro-
vides some interesting welfare and equity issues.
For example, consumer research indicates that
standardizing the presentation of information can
reduce the cognitive costs of information process-
ing. However, we also know that consumers vary
in their ability to process information. As a result,Teisl and Roe Economics of Labeling 145
one question facing makers of information policy
is the level of standardization that should be im-
posed. Policymakers cannot provide labels that sat-
isfy everyone’s information desires while simulta-
neously catering to consumers’ cognitive and time
constraints. As a result, policymakers need to un-
derstand how different information policies affect
different sectors of the consumer population.
Economists, using cost/benefit analysis, may be
able to provide a framework to help answer such
questions. However, relatively little work has been
done to develop a method of benefit analysis for
information changes. For example, current prac-
tices in valuing the economic benefits of nutrition
label changes take the position that the value of a
label change should be judged by the degree to
which it provides “nutritionally correct” behavior
(e.g., Zarkin et al. 1991). This perspective, which
presumes that the “correct behavior” can be pre-
judged by the researcher, is atypical for econo-
mists, who usually assume that the individual is the
best judge of her/his well-being.
The empirical literature validates potential be-
havior changes in the face of label-provided infor-
mation. Therefore, consumers prevented from
making such adjustments by lack of information
will be worse off. However, conceptualizing the
welfare effect of improved information is some-
what perplexing. If one attempts to measure the
welfare effect of information change by using
changes in the consumer surpluses behind affected
demand curves, then a paradox results. Consider a
good, Z, whose production is found to decrease
environmental quality. Dissemination of informa-
tion on this link may lead to backward shifts in the
demand for Z. The consumer surplus associated
with the consumption of Z shrinks and, using this
measure, the consumer appears to be worse off
with the information than helshe was without it.
Foster and Just (1989) address this problem: ce-
teris paribus, individuals are viewed as worse off if
information exists that would help them make bet-
ter choices but, because they are ignorant of the
information, they cannot optimally adjust their be-
havior. When comparing utility and behavior under
two states of information, the choice made with
less information can be viewed as restricted against
the context of better information. While individu-
als make optimal decisions conditional on the in-
formation set available, utility differences under
different information states can be measured as the
difference between the optimal decision under bet-
ter information and the restricted decision under
better information (where the restricted decision is
defined as the optimal decision under poorer infor-
mation). To measure the welfare effects of provid-
ing information, one must assume that the indi-
vidual eventually obtains better information and
does not remain in ignorance. Ultimately, welfare
effects must be measured against the correct infor-
mation; ignorance is bliss only if the individual
never learns the correct information.
To provide a modeling framework to measure
changes in consumer behavior and welfare due to
changes in label information, one needs to know
how attribute information enters an individual’s
utility function (here defined in terms of a purchase
occasion or decision). The utility evaluation can be
represented by the indirect utility function
Vs = V(AS, q, Y,p),
where As denotes a vector of attribute-related qual-
ity assessments fgr m products given information
set S (i.e., As = Y(A~, . . . A;), q denotes a vector
of other (search) quality characteristics (e.g., taste
or texture), p is a corresponding vector of prices, and
Y denotes income. Vs is increasing in q and Y, de-
creasing in p.
The technology that extracts and translates label
information into an assessment of a product’s at-
tribute-related level of quality can be viewed as a
“household production” process by which an in-
dividual combines her prior knowledge, cognitive
abilities, time, and the information presented dur-
ing the purchase decision. Thus, we could model
the assessment process during the purchase deci-
sion as
A: = f(SJ, G, $; 6),
where A; denotes the (subjectively) assessed at-
tribute-related quality level of good j given infor-
mation set S, Sj is the attribute information dis-
played about product j at the point of purchase, G
denotes the consumer’s prior stock of related in-
formation (which may include information from
news accounts or firm-provided advertising), and ~
denotes the time that the individual devotes to pro-
cessing Sj.
The objective level of the attribute represented
by the information variable S is denoted by 6. For
example, if S represents a dolphin-safe claim on a
canned tuna label, then (3denotes that the produc-
tion of the tuna led to no actual dolphin deaths. 8
is separate from the assessment function because
the individual does not observe it at the time of
purchase except through the variable S. Although 0
may be unobservable to the consumer at the time
of the purchase decision, we include it within the
discussion to distinguish between a factor that af-
fects consumer decisions, S, and one that causes
any health or environmental impacts, 0.146 October 1998
We begin by presenting expenditure functions
under two alternative states of information. Denote
e(AO(.), q, U, p)
as the expenditure function when the product at-
tribute is at level O and the information about the
attribute accurately reflects that level (S = O and
reflects the state of 0). Likewise,
e(A1(.), q, U, p)
is the expenditure function when the product at-
tribute is at level 1 and the information about the
attribute reflects the new level (S = 1 and reflects
the state of (3).
Although not commonly framed as such, com-
pensating variation (CV) measures the change in
individual welfare when the qualities of a good
change (denoted as a move from 8 = 0° to 6 = 01)
along with a corresponding change in information
about the quality change (S = Oto S = 1). CV can
be expressed as
CV = e(A1(.), UO, p“) – e (AO(.), UO, p“),
where UO denotes the initial utility level (q is
dropped for simplicity).
CV is an appropriate welfare measure when a
good’s attribute changes and the individual is pro-
vided with information reflecting the change.
However, CV is not appropriate when a good’s
attribute does not change but the individual is pro-
vided with new information so that she adjusts
consumption to avoid possible welfare losses (due
to a decrease in assessed quaIity) or to obtain pos-
sible welfare gains (due to an increase in assessed
quality). Foster and Just (1989) suggest that a use-
ful welfare measure in this case is the cost of ig-
norance.
The cost of ignorance (COI) measures the
change in individual welfare when the quality of a
good does not change but the information about the
good’s quality changes. Following Foster and Just,
the consumer’s choice without new information
can be viewed as being restricted in terms of the
allowed choice of x (the elements of the vector x
measure the quantities purchased of different prod-
ucts). Foster and Just note that COI can be defined
as the difference between a restricted and an unre-
stricted expenditure function
COI = e (p”, UO, Al(.)1 X“)) - e(p”, UO, A1(.)),
where s(.) is a restricted expenditure function be-
cause the individual’s consumption is restricted to
the original bundle, X“ (that is, the quantities of
goods chosen under the old information set). Note
that the COI measure assumes that the individual
eventually obtains better information. That is, the
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restricted expenditure function reflects the situa-
tion where the individual has obtained the better
information but the individual’s choice is restricted
to what it was when the consumer was ignorant.
COI can be measured by finding a price vector,
pl, such that the point represented by the restricted
choice (given p“) is represented by an unrestricted
choice (given pi). Using this approach, COI can be
redefined as
COI = e(p”, UO,A’(.)) - e(pl, UO,A1(.))
+ (pl – p“)X“,
where pl is the price vector such that the original
consumption bundle, X“, would be freely chosen.
Note that COI (for a normal good) is always
greater than or equal to zero; COI denotes the
amount of money an individual is willing to give
up to gain better information about (3so that she is
free to alter consumption.
Foster and Just’s (1989) approach provides a
valuable method of estimating the welfare effects
of changes in information about product attributes,
However, there is a lot yet to learn. First of all, to
our knowledge, Foster and Just’s paper is the only
published attempt at empirically measuring the
welfare effects of information change. However,
their application was limited to information pro-
vided by the news media and focused on one prod-
uct. How to determine the welfare effects of label-
ing when the program may cover a wide variety of
products is less clear. Furthermore, possible differ-
ences in consumer welfare due to different con-
sumer, label, or product characteristics have not
been studied.
Interactions with Other Policy Instruments
Compared with command-and-control options or
performance standards that directly affect the at-
tributes firms produce, clear labeling of attributes
may m-ovide a-less intrusive and often less exuen- . .
‘ 10 sive method of improving market outcomes.
Thus, a costfbenefit analysis may support a label-
ing policy to promote environmental or health
goals, whereas another type of policy may not pass
the cost/benefit test. However, given that environ-
mental labeling may focus on attributes that have
public good aspects, the potential for free-ridership
in product choice may indicate that a labeling pro-
gram by itself may not provide the socially optimal
level of tmblic goods. Because it is unlikelv that
labeling ‘will re~lace other policy instrume~ts, a
potentially rewarding avenue for economic re-
search is to determine the theoretical and empiricalTeisl and Roe Economics of Labeling 147
interactions between labeling programs and other
policy instruments.
Such interaction between labeling and other
policy instruments is at least partially predicated
upon the existence of altruistic preferences by con-
sumers. Johansson (1997) shows that the socially
optimal externality-correcting tax may be less than,
greater than, or equal to the standard Pigouvian tax
for cases in which agents have altruistic utility
functions. The direction and magnitude of this de-
viation critically depends upon the type of altruism
exhibited by the agents, 11For example, Johansson
shows that the optimal Pigouvian tax is still so-
cially optimal in the presence of impure altruism
(Andreoni 1990). Hence, the optimal policy pre-
scription requires knowing how many agents ex-
hibit each type of altruism-a very difficult (if not
impossible) task, both methodologically and politi-
cally.
Dynamic Implications of Labeling on
R&D Investment
A last area of potential research interest is in terms
of the dynamic implications of labeling programs.
That is, how do labeling programs affect firm in-
vestment in the development of new products? Re-
search indicates that nutrient and health-related la-
beling of food products has made significant
changes in the supply of new products by provid-
ing firms an incentive to improve the nutritional
quality of those products (Ippolito and Mathios
1996; Levy and Stokes 1987; Frazao and
AIIshouse 1996). Similar supply-side changes may
be expected to result from the issuance of the new
organic standard, However, the effects of setting or
altering labeling standards on industry research
and development expenditures are difficult to
gauge because of the many subtle and potentially
contradicting incentives that may exist.
Consider a product category in which no item
currently meets the criteria to qualify for a particu-
lar certification. If substantial rewards would go to
the first firm to develop a product reformulation
that meets these criteria and qualifies for the cer-
tification, then substantial research and develop-
ment dollars might be devoted to producing such a
facilitating technology. Now suppose the labeling
criteria were changed such that several different
products qualified for the certification without any
reformulation whatsoever. Firms that qualify for
the claim may have little if any incentive to con-
tinue research to improve the quality of their prod-
ucts. Firms that still do not qualify may simply
adopt or license the technology used by the firms
who qualify for the claims and drop their own re-
search efforts. However, the existence of the new,
“lower bar” may induce some firms to improve
their product quality, whereas the old, “higher
bar” may have been viewed as unachievable and
may also have resulted in no research or product
improvement. Questions concerning the supply-
-side and general-equilibrium effects of altering
certification standards on research and develop-
ment incentives in nutritional quality are difficult
to answer and may require substantial theoretical
and empirical analysis in order to improve our un-
derstanding.
Conclusions
Policymakers are increasingly using product label-
ing as a tool to alter the behavior of market par-
ticipants. Furthermore, economists have long held
that the flow of information plays a critical role in
the efficient operation of markets. It is therefore
somewhat surprising to find that there has been
little in the way of empirical economics research to
determine the market effects (policy effectiveness)
of labeling programs. Of the little research that has
been done, most has focused on nutrition labeling
of food products. Although these studies provide
valuable insights into the potential role of labeling
in correcting market inefficiencies, empirical re-
sults from these studies may not be applicable to
environmental labeling. Although current demand
models can easily be adapted to analyze the market
effects of labeling, data sets that actually allow
isolation of label effects are probably rare. Experi-
mental data sets, generated both in the lab and in
the marketplace, may provide policy-relevant em-
pirical results.
Beyond measuring the policy effectiveness of
labeling programs, economists can contribute to
the design and implementation of these programs
so that they improve social welfare. A stated ob-
jective of the consumer research leading to the de-
sign of the current nutrition label was to enable the
public to make more informed food choices by
providing as complete information as possible
while presenting the information in an easily pro-
cessed form (Levy, Fein, and Schucker 1996). This
suggests an implicit tradeoff between the cost of
information acquisition and information accuracy.
The type and volume of information presented on
a label, as well as the format of the label, will
affect the amount of time and effort an individual
must supply in order to assess product attributes.
After a point, simplified information that is easier
to process can be obtained only at the cost of less148 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
precision. However, simply increasing the amount
of information on a label may actually make any
given amount of information harder to extract
(Chaffee and McLeod 1973). This may cause in-
dividuals without the time or ability to process in-
formation to ignore it (Heimback 1982; Achterberg
1990; Jacoby, Chestnut, and Silberman 1977;
French and Barksdale 1974), leading to less opti-
mal purchasing decisions (Magat, Viscusi, and Hu-
ber 1988).
Unfortunately, the optimum level of simplicity
and detail is likely to be different for different in-
dividuals and for different products. Determining
the optimal form of labeling program is an impor-
tant welfare question because, given the unequal
distribution over the population of cognitive abili-
ties, consumer desires, and values of time, labeling
regulations will have equity and distributional im-
plications, However, only one published study has
examined the welfare implications of information
policy. To understand these implications, policy-
makers need to know the characteristics of labeling
programs preferred by different sectors of the con-
sumer population. Economists, using costfbenefit
analysis, may be able to provide a framework in
which to answer such policy questions.
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Notes
1. 1S0 14000 also designates a Type II label,
which differs from a Type I or III label in that a
Type II label is a se~-declared, single-criterion
claim. Thus, Type II claims include “labels, state-
ments and many other forms of marketing” (Kuhre
1997, p. 15), such as a ‘’40% recycled content”150 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
label on a paper product or a “dolphin-safe” label
on a can of tuna.
2. Note that other policy interventions, such as
minimum quality standards, often remove these
low-quality items from the market, thus depriving
firms and consumers from beneficial trades (Bock-
stael 1984).
3. These three categories follow Nelson’s (1970,
1974) and Darby and Karni’s (1973) classifications
of products.
4. For example, the attribute of taste lies between
search and experience. If one searches enough, one
could taste-test a sample of many foods at a super-
market somewhere.
5. Gehrig and Jest (1995) note that, in some cases,
firms may find it beneficial to impose some type of
self-regulation of information provision. However,
their results focus on experience attributes; cre-
dence and search attributes may have unique as-
pects that affect self-regulation incentives.
6. Consumer Reports has remarked that it does not
plan to offer any summaries in the household elec-
tric service market.
7. Most studies have focused on studying the be-
havioral effects of information provided through
the news media (Swartz and Strand 1981; van
Ravenswaay and Hoehn 1991; Smith, van Raven-
swaay, and Thompson 1988) or the medical litera-
ture (e.g., Brown and Schrader 1990; Chang and
Kinnucan 1991; Capps and Schmitz 1991; Putler
1987; Zuo and Chern 1996).
8. In an exception, consumer researchers at the
FDA (Levy et al. 1985; Levy and Stokes 1987;
Teisl and Levy 1997) used a controlled-market ex-
periment to determine the effect of nutrition label-
ing on consumer purchase behavior. Treatment
stores exhibited shelf labels carrying nutrient in-
formation whereas, during the same time period,
control stores did not carry the nutrient information
on the shelf labels. The studies indicate that label
information can significantly affect market behav-
ior.
9. For example, Andreoni (1995) found that ex-
perimental participants were more likely to con-
tribute to public goods when the experimental in-
structions implied that individual action would
help rather than hurt others, even though the re-
ward structures accompanying both sets of instruc-
tions were identical.
10. The labeling of attributes may allow some
goods to exist that would otherwise be eliminated
under a command and control policy (see note 2),
11. Johansson (1997) outlines four types of altru-
ism: (1) paternalistic-an agent’s value increases
in the amount that other agents consume a particu-
lar good; (2) ncmpaternalistic or pure—the utility
derived by others enters an agent’s utility function;
(3) impure or warm glow—an agent’s own utility
increases only because a transfer is made to others,
not because others increase consumption or utility;
and (4) genuine—an agent acts like a social plan-
ner when optimizing.